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Abstract—In the secure network coding for multicasting, there
is loss of information rate due to inclusion of random bits
at the source node. We show a method to eliminate that loss
of information rate by using multiple statistically independent
messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper. The proposed
scheme is an adaptation of Yamamoto et al.’s secure multiplex
coding [14] to the secure network coding [4], [5], [20].
Keywords—information theoretic security, network coding, se-
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I. Introduction
Network coding [1] attracts much attention recently be-
cause it can offer improvements in several metrics, such as
throughput and energy consumption, see [9], [10]. On the other
hand, the information theoretic security [16] also attracts much
attention because it offers security that does not depend on a
conjectured difficulty of some computational problem.
A juncture of the network coding and the information
theoretic security is the secure network coding [4], [5], which
prevents an eavesdropper, called Eve, from knowing the mes-
sage from the legitimate sender, called Alice, to the legitimate
receivers by eavesdropping intermediate links up to a specified
number in a network. It can be seen [8] as a network coding
counterpart of the traditional wiretap channel coding problem
considered by Wyner [21] and subsequently others [16]. In
both secure network coding and coding for wiretap channels,
the secrecy is realized by including random bits statistically
independent of the secret message into the transmitted signal
by Alice so that the secret message becomes ambiguous to
Eve. The inclusion of random bits, of course, decreases the
information rate. In order to get rid of the decrease in the
information rate, Yamamoto et al. [14] proposed the secure
multiplex coding for wiretap channels, in which there is no
loss of information rate. The idea of Yamamoto et al. is as
follows: Suppose that Alice has T statistically independent
messages S 1, . . . , S T . Then S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T serve
as the random bits making S i ambiguous to Eve, for each i.
The purpose of this paper is to do the same thing with the
secure network coding as Yamamoto et al. [14].
Independently and simultaneously, Bhattad and Narayanan
[3] proposed the weakly secure network coding, whose goal
is also to get rid of the loss of information rate in the
secure network coding. Their method [3] ensures that the
mutual information between S i and Eve’s information is zero
for each i. As drawbacks, the construction depends on the
network topology and coding at intermediate nodes, and the
computational complexity of code construction is large. In
order to remove these drawbacks, Silva and Kschischang
[19] proposed the universal weakly secure network coding,
in which they showed an efficient code construction that can
support up to two Fq-symbols in each S i and is independent of
the network topology and coding at intermediate nodes. They
[19] also showed the existence of universal weakly secure
network coding with more than two Fq-symbols in S i, but
have not shown an explicit construction.
We shall propose a construction of secure multiplex network
coding that is an adaptation of Yamamoto et al.’s idea [14]
to the network coding. However, we relax an aspect of the
security requirements traditionally used in the secure network
coding. In previous proposals of secure network coding [4],
[3], [11], [19], [20] it is required that the mutual information
to the eavesdropper is exactly zero. We relax this require-
ment by regarding sufficiently small mutual information to
be acceptable. This relaxation is similar to requiring the bit
error rate to be sufficiently small instead of strictly zero. Also
observe that our relaxed criterion is much stronger than one
commonly used in the information theoretic security [16]. Our
construction can realize arbitrary small mutual information if
coding over sufficiently many time slots is allowed.
There are several reasonable models of the eavesdropper
Eve. In the traditional model used in [4], [5], [11], [19], [20],
Eve can arbitrary choose the set of µ eavesdropped links after
learning the structure of network coding and the set of eaves-
dropped links is assumed to be constant during transmission
of one coding block. The secure network coding is required
to leak no information with every set of µ eavesdropped links.
We call this model as the traditional eavesdropping model.
We shall show that the proposed scheme is universal secure
in Section III-C in the sense of [19], [20] under the traditional
eavesdropping model.
However, it is observed in [18] that there is difficulty
in implementation over the current Internet architecture to
keep the set of eavesdropped links constant even when the
set of eavesdropped links is physically constant. Thus, we
consider another model of the eavesdropper in which the set
of eavesdropped links is statistically distributed independent
of the structure of transmitter, the number of eavesdropped
links is µ per unit time, and the set of eavesdropped links
is allowed to be time-varying. We call this second model as
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the statistical eavesdropping model. We shall also show that
the mutual information is small averaged over any probability
distribution of network coding statistically independent of any
other random variables, instead of the mutual information
being small with every network coding as done in [4], [5],
[11], [19], [20]. Since the network coding is often constructed
in the random manner [13], considering the probability distri-
bution of network coding and requiring the averaged mutual
information being small make sense. We also define a Shannon
theoretic capacity region of secure multiplex network coding
and show that the proposed construction can achieve that
capacity region.
Although Harada and Yamamoto [11] have not explicitly
stated, the adaptation of the secure multiplex coding [14]
to the secure network coding [4], [5] can be done by their
strongly secure network coding [11]. The difference between
our proposed scheme and the previous works [3], [11], [19] is
as follows:
• The computational complexity of constructing network
coding is huge in [3], [11], while the computational
complexity of code construction in the proposed scheme
is that of selecting a random nonsingular linear matrix.
• The construction of network coding in [3], [11] depends
on the underlying network topology, while the proposed
scheme is independent of it and universal secure in the
sense of [19], [20] under the traditional eavesdropping
model (see Section III-C).
• The explicit construction of universal weakly secure net-
work coding in [19] supports up to two Fq-symbols in
each secret message S i and guarantees that the mutual
information between each S i and Eve’s information is
zero, while the proposed scheme has no limitation on
the size of S i and can make the mutual information
between any collection (S i : i ∈ I) and Eve’s information
arbitrary small1 provided that the total information rate
of (S i : i ∈ I) is not too large relative to µ.
• When the total information rate of (S i : i ∈ I) is large
relative to µ, the mutual information to Eve becomes
positive, but [3], [19] do not evaluate how large it is
nor their smallest possible value. The proposed scheme
realizes asymptotically the smallest possible value of
mutual information with every collection (S i : i ∈ I)
simultaneously, as well as [11].
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews
related results used in this paper. Section III introduces the
strengthened version of the privacy amplification theorem and
the proposed scheme for secure network coding, then proves
the asymptotic optimality of the latter. Section IV concludes
the paper.
II. Preliminary
A. Model of network coding
As in [3], [4], [5], [11], [19], [20] we consider the single
source multicast. The network model is either acyclic or cyclic,
1The mutual information turned out to be exactly zero, see Appendix B.
and each link has either no delay or unit delay. We assume
the linear network coding [15], and a link carries single Fq
symbol per time slot. The linear combination coefficients at
each node are fixed so that every legitimate receiver can
receive n symbols per time slot from the source. Linear
combination coefficients at a node are allowed to change at
each time slot except in Section III-C. We shall only consider
the eavesdropper Eve and forget about the legitimate receivers.
We shall propose a coding method encoding information over
m time slots at the source node. Therefore, the source node
transmit (m×n) Fq symbols in a single coding block. Eve can
eavesdrop µ links per time slot. We assume µ ≤ n throughout
this paper. The total number of eavesdropped links is therefore
mµ.
B. Two-universal hash functions
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [6]
for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Definition 1: Let F be a set of functions from a finite set
S1 to another finite set S2, and F the uniform random variable
on F . If for any x1 , x2 ∈ S1 we have
Pr[F(x1) = F(x2)] ≤ 1
|S2|
,
then F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
III. Construction of secure multiplex network coding
A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to evaluate the mutual information to Eve when the
rate of secret information is large, we need to strengthen the
privacy amplification theorem originally appeared in [2], [12]
as follows. The original version of the privacy amplification
theorems [2], [12] cannot deduce Eq. (11) while Theorem 2
can.
Theorem 2: Let X and Z be discrete random variables on
finite sets X and Z, respectively, and F be a family of two-
universal hash functions from X to S. Let F be the uniform
random variable on F statistically independent of X and Z.
Then we have
E f exp(ρI(F(X); Z|F = f )) ≤ 1 + |S|ρE[PX |Z(X|Z)ρ] (1)
for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, where I denotes the (conditional) mutual
information as defined in [7]. We use the natural logarithm for
all the logarithms in this paper, which include ones implicitly
appearing in entropy and mutual information. Otherwise we
have to adjust the above inequality. Proof will be given in
Appendix A.
B. Description of the proposed scheme
We assume that we have T statistically independent and
uniformly distributed secret messages, and that the i-th secret
message is given as a random variable S i whose realization
is a column vector in Fkiq . The sizes ki are determined later.
We shall also use a supplementary random message S T+1
taking values in FkT+1q when the randomness in the encoder
is insufficient to make S i secret from Eve. We assume mn =
2
k1 + · · · + kT+1. Let L be the set of all bijective Fq-linear
maps from
∏T+1
i=1 F
ki
q to itself, and αI be the projection from∏T+1
i=1 F
ki
q to
∏
i∈I Fkiq for ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. In [17] we
have shown that the family {αI ◦ L | L ∈ L} is that of two-
universal hash functions for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. Let L
be the uniform random variable on L statistically independent
of S 1, . . . , S T+1, and arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }.
Define X to be the random variable L−1(S 1, . . . , S T , S T+1).
The source node sends X to its n outgoing links over m time
slots. Our construction just attaches the inverse of a bijective
linear function to an existing network coding.
By the assumption on Eve, her information can be ex-
pressed as BX by using a µm × mn matrix B over Fq. We
regard B as a random variable (matrix) and its probability
distribution is denoted by PB. We make no assumption on
PB except that the rank of B is at most µm and that B is
independent of S 1, . . . , S T+1, L and X, which means that
Eve does not change B by watching the realization of L.
When the random network coding is used and Eve can choose
locations of up to µ eavesdropping links but cannot choose the
linear coefficients of random network coding, the statistical
independence assumption on B looks reasonable. From the
uniformity assumption on S i, the conditional distribution PX |L
is uniform with every realization of L. This means that X and
L are statistically independent and PX is uniform. For fixed
z, the set {x ∈ Fmnq | Bx = z} has qmn−rankB vectors. Thus,
the conditional distribution PX |BX,L,B(x|z, ℓ, b) is the uniform
distribution on the set of qmn−rankb elements with every triple
of z, ℓ and b. We have
PX |BX,L,B(x|z, l, b) = PX |BX,B(x|z, b) = q−(mn−rankb). (2)
Arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, denote the collection
of random variables (S i : i ∈ I) by S I, also fix a realization
b of B, and let kI =
∑
i∈I ki. Under these notations, we can
upper bound the mutual information I(S I; bX|L) as
Eℓ exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)) (3)
≤ 1 + qρkIE[PX |bX(X|bX)ρ] (by Theorem 2)
= 1 + qρkIE[(q−(mn−rankb))ρ] (by Eq. (2))
≤ 1 + qρkIq−mρ(n−µ) (because rankb ≤ µm)
= 1 + q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m) (4)
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. One can also see that
EℓρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ) (5)
log exp(EℓρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ))
≤ log Eℓ exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ))
≤ log(1 + q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m))
≤ q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m) (6)
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Averaging Eqs. (3)–(6) over b we have
Eb,ℓρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ) ≤ q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m), (7)
Eb,ℓ exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)) ≤ 1 + q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m). (8)
Fix C1 > 2×(2T−1). Equation (7) and the Markov inequality
yield that
PrLI,1 < 1/C1
for any single nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, where LI,1 := {ℓ |
EbI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ) > C1Eb,ℓI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)}.
Thus,
Pr ∪I:I,∅ LI,1 < (2T − 1)/C1.
This means that a realization ℓ of L satisfies
EbI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
≤ C1Eb,ℓI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
≤ C1q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m)/ρ (9)
for all the (2T − 1) nonempty subsets I of {1, . . . , T }
with probability at least 1 − (2T − 1)/C1. Defining another
subset LI,2 := {ℓ | Eb exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)) >
C1Eb,ℓ exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)), by Eq. (8) and the
Markov inequality we obtain
Pr ∪I:I,∅ (LI,1 ∪ LI,2) < 2(2T − 1)/C1.
Therefore, a realization ℓ of L satisfies both Eq. (9) and
Eb exp(ρI(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)) ≤ C1(1 + q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m)).
(10)
with probability at least 1 − 2 × (2T − 1)/C1.
Equation (10) implies
Eb
I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
m
=
1
m
Eb log exp I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
≤
1
m
log Eb exp I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
≤
log C1
mρ
+
1
mρ
log(1 + q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m)) (by Eq. (10))
≤
1 + log C1
mρ
+ (kI/m − (n − µ)) log q, (11)
for kI/m − (n − µ) ≥ 0, where in Eq. (11) we used log(1 +
exp(x)) ≤ 1 + x for x ≥ 0. Note that Eq. (9) is minimized at
ρ = 1, because its partial derivative with respect to ρ is
−
C1q−mρ(n−µ−k/m)
ρ2
−
C1m(n − µ − k/m) log(q)q−mρ(n−µ−k/m)
ρ
,
which is negative for all 0 < ρ ≤ 1. By the same reason Eq.
(11) is also minimized at ρ = 1.
Fix C2 with C2 > 2 × (2T − 1). By the same argument as
above, we see that for a realization ℓ of L satisfying both Eqs.
(9) and (11), with probability at least
1 − 2 × (2T − 1)/C2, (12)
a realization b of B makes
I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ) ≤ C1C2q−mρ(n−µ−kI/m)/ρ, (13)
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I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
m
≤
1 + log C2 + log C1
mρ
+ (kI/m − (n − µ)) log q. (14)
Even when we choose large C2 and C1 and make the
probability of b and ℓ satisfying Eqs. (13) and (14) large, we
can make the upper bound (13) arbitrary small by increasing
m. This observation enables us to use a fixed bijective linear
function ℓ that is agreed between the legitimate sender and
the receivers in advance. The legitimate receiver can apply
the agreed ℓ to the received information in order to restore the
original messages S i.
One can easily see that if ρ = 1 and kI ≤ m(n−µ−δI) with
δI > 0, then the upper bound (13) on the mutual information
exponentially converges to zero as m → ∞. This means that we
can transmit (n−µ) Fq-symbols in the i-th secret message per
time slot with arbitrary small eavesdropped information when
the encoding is allowed to be done over sufficiently many time
slots. On the other hand, if m(n − µ) ≤ kI ≤ m(RI − δI) with
δI > 0 and RI > 0, then by the upper bound (14) we see the
mutual information per symbol is upper bounded by
I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ)
m
< RI − (n − µ)
for sufficiently large m. In Section III-D we shall show that
the proposed scheme is asymptotically optimal by capacity
consideration.
Remark 3: The meanings of C1 and C2 are as follows: At
Eqs. (7) and (8), there might not exist a realization ℓ of L
that satisfies Eqs. (7) and (8) for all subsets I of {1, . . . ,
T } simultaneously. By sacrificing the tightness of the upper
bounds, we ensure the existence of ℓ satisfying Eqs. (9) and
(10). At Eqs. (9) and (10), realizations b of B might satisfy
Eqs. (9) and (10) with unacceptably low probability. Again by
sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure that
the eavesdropping matrix B satisfies Eqs. (13) and (14) with
comfortably high probability.
C. Security analysis of the proposed scheme under the tradi-
tional eavesdropping model
In the preceding study of secure network coding [4], [5],
[11], [19], [20], it is assumed that
• the eavesdropper Eve can choose µ eavesdropped links
per unit time after learning the structure of network
coding, and
• the set of eavesdropped links is constant during transmis-
sion of one coding block.
In Section I we called the above assumption as the traditional
eavesdropping model. Under the above assumption, the num-
ber of possible sets of eavesdropped links is constant, say CE ,
independent of m. If we take the random variable B according
to the uniform distribution on the sets of eavesdropped links
and the probability of some event of B is larger than 1−1/CE
then that probability must be one. Set C2 in Eq. (12) such that
1 − 2 × (2T − 1)/C2 > 1 − 1/CE , then we can see that Eqs.
(13) and (14) hold with every realization of B. In addition
to this, the proposed construction of coding does not depend
on the network topology nor coding at intermediate nodes.
In that sense, the proposed scheme is universal secure [19],
[20] except that the proposed scheme can make the mutual
information arbitrary small2, while [19], [20] make the mutual
information exactly zero.
D. Capacity consideration of the proposed scheme
Firstly, let us define the achievable rate tuple and the
capacity region as in [7].
Definition 4: Suppose that we are given a sequence of
µm × mn random matrices Bm whose distribution PBm has no
restriction except that the rank of Bm is always µm and that
Bm is independent of any other random variables. Let em be a
stochastic encoder from ∏Ti=1 Fmκi,mq to Fmnq , dm either stochastic
or deterministic decoder from Fmnq to
∏T
i=1 F
mκi,m
q , and S i,m the
uniform random variable on Fmκi,mq , for i = 1, . . . , T and m = 1,
2, . . . . If
lim
m→∞
Pr[(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m) , dm(em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))] = 0,
lim sup
m→∞
I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/m
≤ max
0,−(n − µ) +
∑
i∈I
Ri
 ,
lim inf
m→∞
κi,m ≥ Ri,
for all nonempty subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, then the rate
tuple (R1, . . . , RT ) is said to be achievable for the secure
multiplex network coding with T secret messages and up to
µ eavesdropped links per time slots represented by random
matrices Bm, where S I,m denotes the collection (S i,m : i ∈ I)
of secret messages S i,m. We also define the capacity region
of Fq-linear secure multiplex network coding as the closure
of such rate tuples (R1, . . . , RT ) over all the sequences of
encoders and decoders.
Theorem 5: The capacity region Fq-linear secure multiplex
network coding is given by rate tuples (R1, . . . , RT ) such that
0 ≤ Ri,
T∑
i=1
Ri ≤ n.
Proof. The fact that every rate tuple given by the above
equation is achievable is already proved in the previous
section under stronger requirements, namely Pr[(S 1,m, . . . ,
S T,m) , dm(em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))] = 0 for all m, lim supm→∞
I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/m ≤ max{0, ∑i∈I Ri−(n−µ)},
and limm→∞ I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm) = 0 for I with∑
i∈I Ri < (n − µ). We have to show the so-called converse
part of the coding theorem. Fix an arbitrary nonempty subset
I ⊆ {1, . . . , T } and a sequence of random matrices Bm, and
suppose that we have a sequence of stochastic encoders as
defined in Definition 4 with
lim inf
m→∞
∑
i∈I
κi,m ≥
∑
i∈I
Ri + δ (15)
2The mutual information turned out to be exactly zero and our scheme is
exactly universal secure in the sense of [19], [20], see Appendix B.
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for δ > 0 and suppose also that
lim sup
m→∞
I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/m
≤ max
0,
∑
i∈I
Ri − (n − µ)
 . (16)
By Eq. (16) there exists a sequence of µm × mn matrices bm
such that
lim sup
m→∞
I(S I,m; bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))/m
≤ lim sup
m→∞
I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/m
≤ max
0,
∑
i∈I
Ri − (n − µ)
 . (17)
For every m, define am to be an µm × µm matrix and cm to
be an mn × mn matrix such that ambmcm is a matrix of the
horizontal concatenation of the µm × µm identity matrix and
the zero matrix. By Eq. (17) and the data processing inequality
we have
lim sup
m→∞
I(S I,m; ambmcmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))/m
≤ max
0,
∑
i∈I
Ri − (n − µ)
 . (18)
Define X(1)m as the first µm components in the random vector
em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m), and X(2)m as the remaining components in
em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m). We have
H(S I,m|em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))
= H(S I,m|X(1)m , X(2)m )
= H(S I,m) − I(S I,m; X(1)m , X(2)m )
= H(S I,m) − I(S I,m; X(1)m ) − I(S I,m; X(2)m |X(1)m ) (by the chain rule)
= H(S I,m) − I(S I,m; ambmcmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))
− I(S I,m; X(2)m |X(1)m )
≥ H(S I,m) − I(S I,m; bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)) − I(S I,m; X(2)m |X(1)m )
≥ H(S I,m) − I(S I,m; bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)) − H(X(2)m )
≥ m
∑
i∈I
κi,m log q − I(S I,m; bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))
− m(n − µ) log q
≥ m
[(∑
i∈I
κi,m − n + µ
)
log q − I(S I,m; bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))/m
]
≥ m
[(∑
i∈I
κi,m − n + µ
)
log q
− I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/m
]
,
where H denotes the (conditional) entropy as defined in [7].
By abuse of notation, re-define αI to be the projection from∏T
i=1 F
ki
q to
∏
i∈I Fkiq for ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. By using Fano’s
inequality [7, Theorem 2.10.1]
Pr[(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m) , dm(em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))]
≥ Pr[S I,m , αI(dm(em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)))]
≥
H(S I,m|em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)) − 1
log |
∏
i∈I F
mκi,m
q |
≥
1∑
i∈I κi,m log q
[(∑
i∈I
κi,m − n + µ
)
log q
−
1
m
−
I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)
m
]
. (19)
By Eqs. (15), (16) and (19) we can see that
lim supm→∞ Pr[(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m) , dm(em(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m))]
≥ δ/(δ + ∑i∈I Ri) > 0. This shows that the limit of mutual
information I(S I,m; Bmem(S 1,m, . . . , S T,m)|Bm)/n cannot be
lower than
∑
i∈I Ri − (n − µ) while keeping the sum of
information rates
∑
i∈I κi strictly larger than
∑
i∈I Ri.
IV. Conclusion
In the secure network coding, there was loss of information
rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. In
this paper, we have shown that a method to eliminate that loss
of information rate by using multiple statistically independent
messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper, and called
the proposed scheme secure multiplex network coding. The
proposed scheme is an adaptation of Yamamoto et al.’s secure
multiplex coding [14] to the secure network coding [4], [5],
[20].
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 2
In order to show Theorem 2, we introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 6: Under the same assumption as Theorem 2, we
have
E f exp(−ρH(F(X); Z|F = f )) ≤ |S|−ρ + E[PX |Z(X|Z)ρ] (20)
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 2.
E f exp(ρI(F(X); Z|F = f ))
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= E f exp(ρH(F(X)|F = f ) − ρH(F(X); Z|F = f ))
≤ E f |S|ρ exp(−ρH(F(X); Z|F = f ))
≤ E f |S|ρ(|S|−ρ + E[PX |Z(X|Z)ρ]) (by Eq. (20))
= 1 + |S|ρE[PX |Z(X|Z)ρ]
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix z ∈ Z. The concavity of xρ for 0 ≤
ρ ≤ 1 implies
E f
∑
s∈S
P f (X)|Z(s|z)1+ρ
=
∑
x∈X
PX |Z(x|z)E f
( ∑
x′∈ f−1(x)
PX |Z(x′|z)
)ρ
≤
∑
x∈X
PX |Z(x|z)
(
E f
∑
x′∈ f−1(x)
PX |Z(x′|z)
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
(∗)
)ρ
. (21)
Since f is chosen from a family of two-universal hash func-
tions defined in Definition 1, we have
(∗) ≤ PX |Z(x|z) +
∑
x,x′∈X
PX |Z(x′|z)
|S|
≤ PX |Z(x|z) + |S|−1.
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x+y)ρ ≤ xρ+yρ
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we have
(PX |Z(x|z) + |S|−1)ρ ≤ PX |Z(x|z)ρ + |S|−ρ. (22)
By Eqs. (21) and (22) we can see
E f
∑
s∈S
P f (X)|Z(s|z)1+ρ ≤
∑
x∈X
PX |Z(x|z)1+ρ + |S|−ρ.
Taking the average over Z of the both sides of the last equation,
we have
E f EXZP f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z)ρ ≤ EXZPX |Z(X|Z)ρ + |S|−ρ. (23)
Define g(ρ) = EXZ P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z)ρ as a function of ρ with fixed
f and PXZ, and h(ρ) = log g(ρ). We have
g′(ρ) = EXZP f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z)ρ log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z),
g′′(ρ) = EXZP f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z)ρ(log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z))2,
h′(ρ) = g′(ρ)/g(ρ),
h′′(ρ) = g
′′(ρ)g(ρ) − [g′(ρ)]2
g(ρ)2 .
Define (X′, Z′) to be the random variables that have the same
joint distribution as (X, Z) and statistically independent of X
and Z. To examine the sign of h′′(ρ) we compute
g′′(ρ)g(ρ) − [g′(ρ)]2
= EXZX′Z′P f (X)Z( f (X), Z)ρP f (X)Z( f (X′), Z′)ρ
[(log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z))2 − log P f (X)|Z(X|Z) log P f (X)|Z(X′|Z′)]
=
1
2EXZX
′Z′P f (X)Z( f (X), Z)ρP f (X)Z( f (X′), Z′)ρ
[(log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z))2 + (log P f (X)|Z( f (X′)|Z′))2
− 2 log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z) log P f (X)|Z( f (X′)|Z′)]
=
1
2
EXZX′Z′P f (X)Z( f (X), Z)ρP f (X)Z( f (X′), Z′)ρ
[log P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z) − log P f (X)|Z( f (X′)|Z′)]2
≥ 0.
This means that h′′(ρ) ≥ 0 and h(ρ) is convex. We can see
EXZ P f (X)|Z( f (X)|Z)ρ = exp(h(ρ))
≥ exp( h(0)︸︷︷︸
=0
+ρh′(0))
= exp(−ρH( f (X)|Z)). (24)
By Eqs. (23) and (24) we see that Eq. (20) holds.
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Appendix B
Notes added after publication
This appendix is a note after submission of the final version
to Proc. NetCod 2011. In Section III-C we claimed that the
mutual information to Eve can be arbitrary small. This means
that the mutual information can be made exactly zero for every
eavesdropping matrix b. The reason is as follows: For fixed b
and ℓ, we have
I(S I; BX|B = b, L = ℓ) = H(S I|B = b, L = ℓ)−H(S I|bX, L = ℓ).
(25)
The first term H(S I|B = b, L = ℓ) is an integer multiple of
log q since S I is assumed to have the uniform distribution. For
fixed b and ℓ, we have bX = bℓ−1(S 1, . . . , S T+1). For a given
realization bx of bX, the set of solutions s such that bx = bℓ−1s
is written as ker(bℓ−1)+ some vector v. This means that the
set of possible candidates of S I given realization bx of bX
is written as αI(ker(bℓ−1)) + αI(v), and S I given realization
bx is uniformly distributed on αI(ker(bℓ−1)) + αI(v). Since
the cardinality of αI(ker(bℓ−1)) + αI(v) is independent of X
for fixed b and ℓ, the second term H(S I|bX, L = ℓ) is also
an integer multiple of log q. Therefore, if Eq. (13) holds for
every B as verified in Section III-C and the RHS of Eq. (13)
is < log q, then the LHS of Eq. (13) must be zero.
In Section I we overlooked the relevant research result
by Cai (“Valuable messages and random outputs of channels
in linear network coding,” Proc. ISIT 2009, Seoul, Korea,
Jun. 2009, pp. 413–417). Cai proved that random linear
network coding gives the strongly secure network coding in the
sense of [11] with arbitrarily high probability with sufficiently
large finite fields. The advantages of the present result over
Cai’s result are (1) we do not have to change encoding at
intermediate nodes, (2) our construction is universal secure in
the sense of [19], [20], and (3) much smaller finite fields can
be used than Cai’s result.
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